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Abstract 
 
We examine the optimal consumption decisions of households in a micro-founded framework that 
assumes two financial frictions: heterogeneity between borrowing and saving households, and 
endogenous default. We study default in the context of two-period overlapping processes of 
consumer behavior, assuming that penalty costs are imposed on borrowers if they are delinquent in 
the first period and are subsequently refinanced by banks. The utility function of borrowing 
households is specified to include a term reflecting strategic decisions as regards non-payment of 
debt. From the solution of the household optimization problem, we derive an augmented Euler 
equation for consumption, which is a function inter alia of an expected default factor. We use this 
equation to calculate in a static equilibrium the optimal value of the percentage of debt repaid. We 
finally provide an ordering by size of the household discount factor: borrowers who do not repay 
all of their loans have the lowest discount factor, followed in turn by borrowers who fully repay 
them and by savers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized that the recent financial market turmoil has been associated with the 
severest economic contractions since the Great Depression. In the years leading up to the global 
financial crisis, a combination of factors, including low interest rates and lax lending standards, 
fueled a rapid increase in household leverage, as measured by the ratio of debt to personal 
disposable income, which for US households exceeded 130% in 2007 (Glick and Lansing, 2009). 
Countries with very high increases in this ratio prior to the crisis, such as Denmark (with a ratio of 
199%) and Ireland (191%), experienced the largest declines in real consumption (-6.3% and -6.7% 
from the second quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, respectively; see Glick and Lansing, 
2010). In addition, other research (Mian and Sufi, 2010) has shown that the top 10% leverage 
growth counties in the US experienced an increase in the household default rate of 12 percentage 
points (from the second quarter of 2006 through the second quarter of 2009) and also the sharpest 
decline in durables consumption.  
 
Against these stylized facts, in this paper we study the optimal consumption decisions of 
households in a micro-founded framework by setting up a dynamic equilibrium model in which we 
introduce two financial frictions: agent heterogeneity and endogenous default. As to agent 
heterogeneity, Tobin (1980) indicated that the population of households is not distributed randomly 
between debtors and creditors. Thus, debtors are frequently young families acquiring homes and 
consumer durables through borrowing; given the difficulty of borrowing against future income, 
they are liquidity-constrained and have a high marginal propensity to consume. Middle-aged 
families, on the other hand, are usually savers accumulating wealth. In our model, we incorporate 
household heterogeneity, as in Iacoviello (2005); Agenor et al. (2013); Gelain et al. (2013); Suh 
(2014); Kannan et al. (2012), where the household sector consists of two types of households: 
saving (unconstrained or patient) households and borrowing (constrained or impatient) 
households
1
; we assume that the former do not lend directly to the latter. Instead, as in Kannan et 
al. (2012), we consider that financial intermediaries take deposits from saving households, offering 
a deposit rate, and lend to borrowing households, charging a borrowing rate. Heterogeneity is also 
distinguished by the household discount factor, where the usual assumption is that the discount 
factor of borrowers is smaller than the respective discount factor of savers.  
As to the second financial friction, the endogenous default, most models in the literature consider 
that default happens in a single step (Dubey et al., 2005; Chang, 2005; Goodhart et al., 2009). In 
Goodhart et al. (2009), households choose what percentage of outstanding debt they will repay, 
determining the level of the unpaid part. Einav et al. (2012) present a standard consumer theory 
                                                          
1
 Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models do not include agent heterogeneity, but assume that there 
is one representative household, the saving household. 
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framework where heterogeneous borrowers decide how much to borrow, taking decisions about 
whether to continue making loan payments or to default. They use a model to derive a set of linear 
estimating equations that capture purchasing of goods, borrowing, and repayment decisions. They 
put emphasis on the larger loans which cause higher monthly payments and also have a higher 
probability of default. Similarly, in Chatterjee et al. (2007), default risk will vary with the size of 
the loan and household’s specific characteristics. Moreover, in Dubey et al. (2005), default can 
either occur for strategic reasons
2
 or be due to ill fortune
3
. However, most of the literature presents 
endogenous default only for the business sector and not for the household sector in DSGE 
frameworks. 
 
The existence of default affects banks’ lending guidelines and induces them to follow a stricter 
path, especially for the cases of strategic default (Huber et al., 2012). To discourage borrowers 
from defaulting, financial intermediaries impose costs, either directly through penalty on the 
interest rate for defaulters or indirectly by raising the lending interest rates for borrowers with a 
past record of bankruptcy. As noted by Chatterjee et al. (2007), households for whom the period 
begins with a record of bankruptcy cannot get new loans. However, with an exogenous probability, 
their bad credit rating is expunged after a certain period, since an individual’s credit history is kept 
only for a finite number of years. Borrowers enter again the credit market, being charged a 
pecuniary cost which affects their financial constraint. In de Walque et al. (2010), the cost of 
default affects both the utility function as a non-pecuniary burden (social stigma, reputation cost) 
and the budget constraint as a pecuniary burden, although these authors’ analysis refers to default 
of firms. In a similar vein, Einav et al. (2012) mention that default affects utility of households due 
to potential costs associated with default, such as a constant per-loan indirect cost. It is argued 
(Dubey et al., 2005) that banks should charge penalties, irrespective of the cause of default, since it 
is difficult to study the strategic decision. Strategic defaulters have every incentive to disguise 
themselves as agents who are not able to repay their contractual obligations (Guiso et al., 2009).  
 
In our model, we extend the analysis of loan default to two periods. In a given period, some of the 
unpaid loans of households come to default, while the rest is delinquent debt refinanced by banks 
in the following period and carrying a penalty cost. A percentage of delinquent debt is recovered in 
the second period but the other part also comes to default. 
 
                                                          
2 Guiso et al. (2009) determine the reasons why households may strategically default on their debts, such as economic 
and moral incentives. Also, borrowers may have the incentive to use their borrowed money to finance consumption or 
simply to hide loan proceeds from their creditors, defaulting on their promise to repay (Manove et al., 2001).  
3 Baltensperger (1975) argues that the decision to default means that it is possible that the borrowing household’s income 
is not sufficient to cover its debt.    
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Our work contains several novel features. First, unlike typical DSGE models, our household sector 
is split into two different sub-sectors, borrowing and saving households. Borrowers always borrow 
while savers always save. As a matter of fact, this dichotomy explains why optimal consumption 
decisions of these two groups are essentially independent of each other. For borrowing households 
we derive, by solving the household maximization problem, an augmented Euler equation, which 
determines the household optimal consumption, as a function inter alia of an expected default 
variable. Second, as mentioned above, default is studied in the context of an infinite number of 
overlapping processes of consumer behavior with periodicity two. Thus, borrowers do not repay all 
of their debt in a given period. From the unpaid debt, a part comes to default in the same period, 
while the other part is refinanced in the following period by banks, who charge a penalty premium 
on the interest rate; again, a proportion of refinanced debt is not repaid in that period but also 
comes to default. Third, we specify the borrowing household’s utility function by including a term 
to reflect the household’s strategic decisions regarding non-payment of the debt. Interestingly, this 
utility component is shown to be an indispensable part of the specification since, by including it, 
the Hessian matrix of the household’s maximization problem is negative definite and therefore the 
solution is a maximum. Without it, the said Hessian matrix is non-definite and therefore does not 
guarantee the existence of a maximum. Fourth, the percentage of debt repaid is a basic decision 
variable in the household’s optimization problem. The optimal value of this variable in a static 
equilibrium, in which there is optimal consumption smoothing, is shown to depend on a number of 
determinants, specifically the time preference rate, the borrowing interest rate, the penalty premium 
added on the interest rate and the percentage of unpaid debt which is refinanced by banks. Finally, 
an ordering by size is provided for the discount factor of the different types of households: 
borrowers who do not repay all of their loans have the lowest discount factor, followed in turn by 
borrowers who fully repay their loans and by savers.   
  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the borrowing household’s optimal consumption 
decisions are analyzed in the framework of an augmented Euler equation for consumption, which 
includes an expected default variable in addition to other variables already in the literature. Further, 
the determinants of the household decision to repay its debt obligations are analyzed in a static 
equilibrium context. In Section 3, the behavior of the saving household is briefly examined and the 
two types of households are combined in the same model. This section also provides an ordering by 
size of discount factors (or time preference rates) of households. Section 4 concludes and suggests 
some directions for further work.  
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2. Optimal decisions for borrowing households 
 
In this section we develop a dynamic equilibrium model that determines the optimal consumption 
and default decisions for borrowing households
4,5
. In the following we assume that there is a 
population of infinitely-lived homogeneous
6
 households that consume a consumption bundle. The 
representative household does not save but borrows from banks (the loan supply of which is 
perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate) to support consumption smoothing
7
, i.e. it is a 
borrowing household. The household derives utility from consuming goods and services, disutility 
from supplying labor to producers of goods and services and also utility from the unpaid part of the 
debt which is a result of its choice (strategic decision). Further, we assume that the household can 
default on its loan
8
. The household can become delinquent (an earlier stage of default)
9
 or come to 
default for reasons such as cash flow problems (due to negative income shocks or downturn of the 
business cycle) or failure to meet banks’ minimum credit requirements. Also, according to Huber et 
al. (2012), if agents were allowed to borrow and the marginal utility of income was more than the 
marginal disutility of debt, this would be a good reason for them to borrow more and to default, 
applying strategic defaulting
10,11
. 
  
In the current period, the household buys consumer goods and services and works in the production 
process, earning income for labor services provided. At the end of each period, the household can 
obtain a loan from banks (one-period loan
12
). At the end of the current period, part of the previous 
period loan, including interest, is serviced, while the rest is not. The regular servicing of the loan is 
followed by an extension of a new one-period loan by the banks and the same process runs in the 
following period. In the case where part of the previous period’s loan is not serviced, the household 
either obtains a new loan in the following period
13
 (the proceeds of which are used to repay the 
                                                          
4 The analysis is carried out in discrete time. 
5 The model is characterized by an infinite number of two-period overlapping processes.  
6 Homogeneity means that households have the same preferences and do not face any idiosyncratic shocks or frictions. 
7 The notion of consumption smoothing usually describes an attempt to keep consumption similar in each period. 
8 Not all households are assumed to default. Thus, default is measured by the default rate, i.e. the ratio of the value of 
debt in default to the value of total debt. It is in this sense that the default rate refers to the representative household. 
9 In the household decision not to repay, delinquency is preferable, at least initially, since surviving via delinquency may 
help to avoid any costs associated with default (Athreya et al., 2012).  
10 In Guiso et al. (2009), it is reported that survey data for the US indicate that about one out of four households that 
default applies strategic defaulting.   
11 As discussed in the literature (e.g. Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2013), one way to discourage defaulters is to configure an 
appropriate macro-prudential framework with well-planned and effective tools, such as default penalties and strict 
indicators (e.g. loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio), which would factor into default decisions. 
12 Roszbach (2004) notes that in financial markets with perfect information any optimal multi-period financial contract 
can be obtained by a sequence of one-period loan agreements, while under asymmetric information things become more 
intricate. Also, Besanko and Thakor (1987) develop a single-period credit model under asymmetric information and 
assume that no borrower has an initial endowment and each must approach a lender for a one-period loan. 
13 We assume that banks refinance when they assess that households meet certain credit requirements set by them, e.g. 
debt-to-income threshold or credit history.   
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unpaid loan), being charged a penalty premium on the interest rate
14
, or defaults. Again, only a 
proportion of households that renewed their loan for the next period are in a position to pay off 
their debt, while the rest also come to default. The above two groups of defaulters determine the 
household default rate. The debt in default is written off from banks’ balance sheets.  
 
The household is assumed to have a life-time utility function: 
 
        
   
 
   
      
      
                                                                                                                                       
 
where    denotes the expectation of the household, conditional on information available at time t, 
   is the subjective discount factor (capturing the idea of impatience)15, which discounts future 
utility, with 0<  <1, and   denotes utility which is related to real consumption (    
 ), working 
hours (    
   expressed as a ratio to total available time per day) and unpaid debt, reflecting strategic 
decisions (    )
 16
. The utility function is assumed to be time separable and twice differentiable 
with respect to consumption, working hours and unpaid debt. The marginal utility of consumption 
and unpaid debt is positive and non-increasing, while that of working hours is negative and non-
decreasing. Equation (1) simply states that the household is interested in life-time utility    
obtained as the present discounted value of current and all future levels of expected utility. The 
functional form of the utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion type:  
 
    
    
      
   
     
   
 
   
     
   
 
  
   
   
                                                                                                               
 
where    ,    ,     is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, working time 
and  unpaid debt, respectively.  
 
The household is also assumed to be subject to a sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms), 
which describe its feasible choices through time. These constraints are of the form (for period t): 
 
    
           
                           
                 
                    
                                                          
14 The premium may be set by the financial regulator and its magnitude is determined by factors such as credit history 
and reputation of borrowers, search costs of banks and risk parameters. 
15 The impatient household values future utility less than present utility. 
16 At the end of each period, the household takes a decision to repay or not to repay its previous period debt. Regarding 
the second leg of the decision, there are two possible options: a) one in which households do not afford to repay, having 
already consumed all of their borrowed money (cash flow problems), and b) the strategic decision not to repay. In the 
latter case, the amount of money from the loan is neither consumed nor used for repaying banks. Further, the household 
cannot invest in a financial asset (deposit, bond), since in such an instance banks would immediately liquidate their 
claims. For this reason, the household’s real money balances at the end of the period, after consumption goods have been 
purchased, increase current utility only by holding them (cf. Walsh, 2010). 
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Equation (3) displays the household’s receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows) stemming from 
its income-generating and financing activities. The left-hand side contains payments. The first term 
is consumption expenditure, where    is the price index of consumer goods and services. 
 
The second term involves the assumption that, concerning the loan contracted at the end of period 
t-2, i.e.     , the bank refinances only a part of the loan that has not been serviced at the end of 
period t-1, i.e.                    
      , where     
  is the lending rate of period t-2 in nominal 
terms,        is the percentage of the loan (plus interest), i.e.        
      , that has not been 
repaid at the end of period t-1         and      is the percentage of the unpaid loan at the end 
of t-1 that is refinanced by the bank        . The terms of that refinancing will be discussed 
below. Excluding this component,                         
       represents net borrowing of 
households at the end of period t-1, which is made for consumption purposes, and          
   
                          
        is the percentage of that borrowing (including interest) which 
is repaid at the end of period t, while the rest is not repaid.  
 
Further, the third term focuses on the unpaid part of the loan at the end of period t-1 that is assumed 
to be refinanced by banks. The interest rate charged on that loan is the lending rate     
  augmented 
by a penalty premium     17 and the proceeds of the loan are used to repay the unpaid loan. Again, 
as already indicated, only a proportion of households that renewed their loan are in a position to 
repay their debt at the end of period t (the rest coming to default) so that the amount of the loan 
paid back is          
                           
       . 
 
The right-hand side includes receipts. The first term shows the income earned from labor, where   
is the nominal wage rate, and the other term refers to net borrowing in period t, namely the loan 
obtained      less the amount used by the household to repay its unpaid but refinanced by the bank 
loan, which reduces the household default of the period.  
 
Rearranging the terms of equation (3) and doing some simple algebra gives a simplified 
presentation of the budget constraint: 
 
    
                      
                                
           
                           
 
                                                          
17 In Huber et al. (2012), the imposition of default penalties, in addition to preventing strategic bankruptcy from 
borrowers, is shown to also resolve the multiplicity of equilibria that is known to exist in closed economies, and in Dubey 
et al. (2005), default penalties are imposed on agents who fail to repay their debts, irrespective of the cause of default. 
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This form of the budget constraint has an interesting reading. In particular, the second term is the 
proportion of capitalized debt that has been repaid by households or has not been repaid and has 
been refinanced by the banks. Also, the third term is the amount of the penalty paid on the previous 
period’s capitalized debt that has been refinanced. The other terms are as in equation (3). 
 
Given the analytical exposition of the budget constraint just presented, we can write an expression 
for the household default rate. The amount of household debt in default at the end of period t 
consists of two parts: a) the amount of capitalized debt, that has not been repaid by the household 
and has not been refinanced by the banks and b) the amount of the unpaid penalty. Thus, the 
household default rate      is the ratio of the sum of the above two components of default divided 
by the value of capitalized debt: 
 
   
                   
                                    
      
       
      
                                          
 
Now the problem facing the representative household is to choose its decision variables, i.e. 
consumption, working hours, loans and the percentage of debt repaid, to maximize utility given the 
state variables, i.e. wage rate, interest rate, price level, penalty premium on the interest rate and the 
percentage of unpaid debt which is refinanced. Thus, the problem is to maximize  
 
        
   
 
   
 
     
     
   
 
     
     
   
 
    
   
   
                                                                                                   
where                           
                                                                                                                  
and ω refers to the unpaid part of the debt in period t, which is a result of strategic decision, with 
(     ) 18,  
 
under a set of flow budget constraints (like equation 4). 
 
Combining equations (4), (6) and (7), we form the Lagrangian of this problem: 
 
        
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
   
 
     
     
   
 
                      
         
   
   
 
     
        
               
                              
         
                                    
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
        
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.   
                                                          
18 Given the unpaid part of the debt, which is due to external economic factors, the percentage of debt repaid (   bears a 
constant relationship to the percentage of unpaid debt which is a result of strategic decision (ω); the latter variable 
therefore does not appear in the solution of the optimization problem.  
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We take first-order conditions for consumption, working hours, loans and the percentage of debt 
repaid, as shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Combining equations (1.a) and (1.b) from this Appendix, yields the familiar result (see e.g. Gali, 
2008): 
 
 
    
    
 
  
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
where     
 is the marginal utility of working hours and     
 is the marginal utility of consumption, 
describing the optimal consumption-leisure decision. According to this equation, the marginal rate 
of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the real wage, and households cannot gain 
utility by shifting from work to consumption. 
 
Further, by combining equations (1.a) and (1.e) and writing equation (1.a) one period forward, we 
derive the Euler equation19 for the household optimal consumption; it is essentially an equilibrium 
relation
20
, where for given values of the state (exogenous) and other decision variables, there is no 
tendency for the path of consumption to change: 
 
   
    
  
   
        
     
        
     
     
                             
      
     
    
                                       
 
The Euler equation determines the borrowing household’s optimal consumption as a function inter 
alia of a component of the expected default rate, namely the expected amount of the unpaid penalty 
as a proportion of the value of capitalized debt (cf. eq. 5).  
 
Using a log-linear approximation to equation (10) yields (cf. Gali, 2008): 
 
  
         
   
 
 
   
            
  
                             
      
     
    
                                       
 
where   
      
          
            
                
        
  
              
 
                                                          
19 This equation is the optimal solution to the representative household maximization problem, as proved in Appendix 2. 
Without the term    in the objective function (1), the Hessian matrix is non-definite and therefore does not guarantee the 
existence of a maximum.
 
20 All endogenous (decision) variables are at their equilibrium values since all first-order conditions are satisfied and the 
Hessian matrix is negative definite implying that these values are necessarily maxima. 
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This equation is augmented relative to that of the literature (see, among others: Gali, 2008; Romer, 
2012) by including a default premium over the real interest rate
21
. The equation presents the 
relation between the current level of consumption and the next period’s expected level of 
consumption
22
, the real interest rate
23
, the time preference rate and an expected default factor. 
Consumption decisions of the current period are affected negatively by the default factor, since any 
rise in next period’s expected default decreases current consumption, so that the future 
consequences of default, either pecuniary (default penalty, inability of future borrowing) or non-
pecuniary (bad reputation), are limited. Further, any policy move either by the monetary authorities 
who adjust the short-term nominal interest rate thus affecting the corresponding real rate in the 
short run, or by the supervisory authorities who raise the penalty premium on the interest rate 
affecting upwards the expected default rate, or by the commercial banks in their refinancing policy, 
alters the optimal consumption path. Thus, the Euler equation includes the degree of control over 
the household available to the financial system (central bank, financial regulator, commercial 
banks) in the most basic model, i.e. that of a closed economy without a public sector.  
 
Using the Euler equation, which as already indicated is a dynamic equilibrium relation, to deduce 
the long-run static equilibrium relation, i.e. one in which all variables are time-invariant
24
, we 
obtain the following expression for the optimal value of the decision variable μ, i.e. the percentage 
of the debt repaid: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
As can be seen from this equation, the variable μ depends on four determining factors: the penalty 
premium on the interest rate (f), the percentage of unpaid debt which is refinanced (k), the real 
interest rate (  ) and the rate of time preference (  ). The penalty premium has a positive effect on 
μ, since its rise induces households to repay more in order to avoid incurring higher premiums. The 
percentage of unpaid debt which is refinanced has similarly a positive effect, since the higher level 
of obligations arising from an increase in k is expected to lead to a higher μ. Τhe interest rate has 
also a positive impact on μ, reflecting the household’s willingness to repay more when    is higher 
                                                          
21 As noted by Baltensperger (1975), it can be reasonably assumed that individuals expect that the rate of interest on a 
loan has to be adjusted upwards in the presence of default risk since in this case the interest rate should contain a risk 
premium. 
22 Most of the empirical literature on the Euler equation for consumption relies on a purely backward-looking 
specification of the optimal consumption decisions. Exceptions are Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2005), who allow for forward-looking elements. 
23 According to Etro (2009), optimal consumption is increasing over time if the real interest rate is larger than the rate of 
time preference. Consumption smoothing is optimal if they are equal.  
24 This relation corresponds to a situation of optimal consumption smoothing (see footnote 23 above).  
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so as to mitigate the higher risk of future default. Finally, an increase in the time preference rate 
implies a lower discount factor
25
 and hence its effect on μ will be negative.  
 
By rearranging the terms of equation (12), we arrive at the following expression for the real interest 
rate: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
whereby the default factor is negatively associated with the real interest rate.    
 
In equation (12), when    , namely households repay all of their debt and there is no household 
default in the economy, the interest rate (real) equals the default-free rate of time preference   , i.e.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
a standard result in models without consumer default (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). When, on 
the other hand,      , which signifies the existence of default, the real interest rate can be 
shown to vary in the following interval:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Thus, the household borrowing cost (real interest rate) is bounded between a minimum value equal 
to the benefit in terms of increase in future utility minus the extra cost of the refinanced debt due to 
the imposition of the penalty premium on the interest rate, and a maximum value equal to the above 
benefit.    
 
 
3. Optimal decisions for borrowing and saving households 
 
In this section, we assume that the household sector consists of two different types of households, 
the borrowing and the saving household. The former is characterized by a lower inter-temporal 
discount factor, which generates an incentive for it to borrow, i.e. this household is financially 
constrained. As in Agenor et al. (2013) and Suh (2014), savers can hold financial assets and trade 
in asset markets, while borrowers do not participate in asset markets
26
. They have also the same 
                                                          
25 In the next section, we show that borrowers who do not repay all of their loans have a lower discount factor compared 
with either borrowers who repay fully their loans or savers. 
26 Saving households will always save and borrowing households will always borrow. The household in solving the 
optimization problem will never choose to engage in both saving and borrowing. This is ensured by the condition that the 
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inter-temporal elasticities of substitution. We assume a fraction ψ of households to be borrowers 
and the remaining fraction 1-ψ to be savers. 
 
The maximization problem of the borrowing household has been analyzed in section 2, while the 
behavior of the saving household is going to be examined briefly in the following subsection. 
Finally, the combination of the two types of households in the same model is going to be analyzed 
in the second subsection.  
 
3.1. The optimization problem of the saving household 
 
The saver’s utility maximization problem presents no novelties but we show it here for the sake of 
completeness. To ensure comparability of the results, our analysis uses the same general 
assumptions as in the case of the borrowing household. The only difference is that the saving 
household does not borrow but saves, investing its saving in deposits
27
, the maturity of which is 
assumed to be one period. At the end of the current period, deposits including interest are 
withdrawn. 
 
The saving household is further assumed to have a life-time utility function: 
 
        
   
 
   
      
      
                                                                                                                                           
 
having as arguments only consumption and working hours;    is the discount factor of savers. As 
with borrowing households, the functional form of the utility function is of the constant relative 
risk aversion type:  
 
    
    
   
   
     
   
 
   
     
   
                                                                                                                                      
 
Also, the saving household is assumed to be subject to an infinite number of budget constraints, 
which have the following form (for period t): 
 
    
         
         
                                                                                                                                     
where    are deposits at the end of period t and     
  is the deposit rate of the previous period.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
saving interest rate is lower than the borrowing rate. In fact, the borrowing rate is a markup over the saving rate since 
banks which intermediate between borrowers and savers need to cover the costs of intermediation. However, the relation 
between these two rates need not concern us further here.  
27 We assume that bonds that may be issued by the private sector (firms) are perfect substitutes for deposits as a means of 
saving, i.e. they have the same rate of return. 
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The household’s maximization problem consists in choosing its decision variables, i.e. 
consumption, working hours and deposits, so as to maximize utility subject to an infinite number of 
inter-temporal budget constraints of the form of eq. (18). The Lagrangian of this problem is set up 
by combining equations (16), (17) and (18): 
 
        
 
   
 
     
     
   
 
     
     
   
              
           
                 
                   
 
In Appendix 3, we present the first-order conditions for consumption, working hours and deposits 
(eqs 3.a, 3.b and 3.d). From these equations the standard Euler equation for consumption can be 
derived, which is commonly encountered in the literature. 
  
  
         
   
 
 
   
          
                                                                                                                                
 
where    is the time preference rate of savers. 
 
The long-run static equilibrium relation corresponding to this equation is: 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
i.e. the (real) deposit rate equals the time preference rate of savers. 
 
3.2. The optimization problem of borrowing and saving households 
 
The Euler equations for consumption are next examined for both borrowing and saving households. 
The two equations are equations (11) and (20) of sections 2 and 3.1 above. By noting that the 
optimization problems of the two households are essentially independent of each other, we can 
combine them in a weighted average sense in one representative Euler equation for total 
consumption. Thus, by multiplying equation (4.a) of Appendix 4 by ψ
28
 and equation (4.b) by 
1-ψ and by adding outcomes we obtain the following result in terms of total household 
consumption: 
 
            
 
 
    
            
  
                             
      
     
    
  
                                                          
28 Assuming that households do not move between the two groups, which implies that ψ remains constant over time. 
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Overall consumption is a weighted average of consumption of both types of households (Wieland 
and Wolters, 2013), where the weights are the percentage of each type of households in the 
population. As noted by Suh (2014), the separation of the two Euler equations is useful to see how 
monetary policy and macro-prudential policy affect differently the inter-temporal consumption 
decisions of borrowing and saving households. From the analysis already presented above, it can be 
understood that monetary policy affects decisions of both households, while macro-prudential 
policy only affects decisions of borrowing households. This stems from the fact that macro-
prudential policy tools, e.g. loan-to-value ratios and default penalties, affect borrowing households’ 
behavior, in particular through loans, which are a basic determinant of the default rate (see equation 
5 above). 
 
A critical parameter in the household’s optimization problem is the household’s discount factor or, 
equivalently, its time preference rate
30
. The discount factor is a measure of how strongly consumer 
choices depend on expectations because it weighs current utility and expected utility from future 
choices. A change in expectations affects observable choices of consumers with higher discount 
factors more than choices of consumers with smaller discount factors. Therefore, an ordering by 
size of discount factors is required for all types of households, particularly in empirical calibrations 
of dynamic models of consumer behavior to make them relevant for optimal policy making.  
 
The literature compares the discount factors of savers and borrowers who repay all of their debts. 
Because under optimal consumption smoothing, the time preference rate of each of these two 
groups is equal to the respective interest rate, and the borrowing rate is higher than the saving rate, 
the borrowers' time preference rate is also higher than that of savers (     ); the reverse is true 
for the discount factor, i.e.      . 
 
In our analysis we distinguish between borrowing households that repay all of their debts and those 
that do not repay the debts fully, and thus we admit the possibility of default in the latter’s 
decisions. The parameter μ in the model developed, where μ lies between 0 and 1, characterizes this 
subgroup of borrowers. Equation (13) above shows that these borrowers' time preference rate is the 
borrowing rate (real) plus the default premium         , which is a positive quantity, and, 
                                                          
29 With no capital, and therefore no investment, the economy’s aggregate resource constraint is simply      , i.e. all 
output must be consumed, and equation (22) can be interpreted as an aggregate demand equation.   
30 The discount factor and the time preference rate are connected with the following relation:       , see also eq. (11) 
above. 
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therefore, is higher than the default-free time preference rate, i.e.       . This provides a unique 
ordering by size of time preference rates as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
or a reverse ordering for discount factors 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
These calculations assess the discount factor/time preference rate when there is a possibility of non-
payment, and consequently a default risk, associated with borrowing households. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the optimal consumption decisions of households in a micro-founded 
framework that assumes two financial frictions: agent heterogeneity and endogenous default. We 
set up a dynamic equilibrium model in which the household sector consists of two different sub-
sectors: borrowing households and saving households. For the former, by solving the optimization 
problem, we derived an augmented Euler equation, which includes an expected default variable as 
an additional argument to those already in the literature. 
In our model, default is studied in the context of an infinite number of overlapping processes of 
consumer behavior with periodicity two. In this respect, borrowers were assumed not to repay all of 
their debt in a given period. A percentage of unpaid debt comes to default in the same period, for 
reasons such as cash flow problems, while the other part is refinanced by banks in the following 
period and a penalty premium is added onto the interest rate of the loan. Again, a proportion of 
refinanced debt is not repaid in that period but also defaults. 
We further obtained a static equilibrium relation for the proportion of debt repaid. In particular, 
according to our results, this decision variable was shown to depend on a number of determinants: 
the time preference rate, the borrowing interest rate, the penalty premium on the interest rate and 
the percentage of unpaid debt which is refinanced by banks. In addition, an ordering by size was 
provided for the discount factor, with borrowers who do not repay all of their loans having the 
lowest discount factor, followed in turn by borrowers who fully repay their loans and finally by 
savers. 
Our work represents a promising line of research for incorporating macro-prudential tools in one of 
the basic components of DSGE models, making the latter more appropriate for analyzing monetary 
and macro-prudential policies. The results of our paper may generate interesting trade-offs in a 
16 
 
typical DSGE model for the economy as a whole. This, however, remains an important task for 
future work. 
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Appendix 1 
We take first-order conditions in equation (8) as follows: 
  
   
     
               
   
    
  
                                                                                                                         
  
   
      
               
   
   
  
                                                                                                                     
  
   
           
                      
       
                  
         
                          
        
                    
                                                                     
  
   
     
                  
                    
     
                               
      
                                    
                                                                                              
 
By re-arranging equation (1.c), writing it one period forward and substituting in equation (1.d), we 
finally get:   
 
    
          
     
                           
      
     
    
                                                                     
 
 
Appendix 2 
We take second-order conditions in equation (8) as follows: 
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where Hb is the Hessian matrix, 
                
                              
       
                  
       
      
                    
     
      
 
 
The leading principal minors of the above Hessian matrix are as follows: 
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As a result, the Hessian matrix is negative definite. 
 
 
Appendix 3 
We take first-order conditions in equation (19) as follows: 
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Appendix 4 
From equation (11) we obtain : 
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From equation (20) we obtain: 
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